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Abstract. In this article, we focus on the question of target management resistance and the incidence of subse­
quent bids. A Poisson count data model is used where the dependent variable represents the number of bids (count) 
received and the independent variables comprise target management actions and firm specific characteristics. 
Of the target management actions considered, legal defense and the entry of a white knight are associated with 
additional bids. With respect to firm specific characteristics, we find that a high initial bid premium deters subse­
quent bids. Firm size is also significant and has an interesting relationship with the number of bids received. 
Larger target firms tend to receive more bids; however, the number ofbids tails offfor firms with assets exceedng 
$12 billion. 
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1. Introduction 
Target managements facing hostile tender offers often resist the takeover attempt by way 
of litigation and a whole range of anti-takeover measures. This defensive activity has led 
to some controversy and the formulation of two competing hypotheses.1 The managerial 
entrenchment hypothesis essentially holds that in undertaking defensive actions, incumbent 
managers act in self-interest (to hold on to their jobs/perquisites) and against the interests 
of stockholders. The stockholder interest hypothesis contends that a diverse body of stock­
holders are at a competitive disadvantage when confronted with a hostile tender offer. They 
empower incumbent management to take actions necessary to elicit a fair bid price. It has 
been shown that when the tender offer fails, the stock price reverts to the pre-contest level 
(see Bradley et al. (1983)). In such cases, since target stockholders lose their premium, 
it could be argued ex post that target management was driven by entrenchment motives. 
From the stockholders' perspective, target management resistance ought to generate an auc­
tion that eventually leads to a successful takeover. 
In this article, we consider a related but somewhat narrower question. We analyze suc­
cessful tender offers which almost by definition are wealth enhancing to investors who hold 
stock in the target firm prior to the public announcement of the first bid. Our sample con­
sists of target firms where management initially resisted the tender offer but eventually 
capitulated either to the original bidder or to some other bidder who may have entered the 
bjdding process. From our sample construction, it should be clear that we have consciously 
chosen to study those target firms whose managements appear to have been guided by 
stockholder interest, at least when viewed ex post. Our intention is not to revisit the man­
agement entrenchment versus stockholder interest hypotheses per se. Rather, conditioned 
on the premise that target management has acted in stockholder interest, our aim is to 
study (a) the nature of target management actions that lead to an auction type process and 
(b) whether an auction is spurred or inhibited by finn specific characteristics that are beyond 
management's immediate sphere of influence. We b~Jieve that our study contributes to the 
literature on the effects of target management resistance and may have implications for cor­
porate policy. 
We employ count data methodology in which the dependent variable represents the number 
of bids after the initial bid (count) received by the target fi.I1ll.2 For parametric estimation, 
we assume that our dependent variable follows a Poisson distribution. Furthermore, as esti­
mates may be sensitive to the choice of model, it is essential to test the validity of the para­
metric assumptions (see MacKinnon (1992)). Accordingly, we implement two tests whose 
results support the Poisson specification for our application. 
The mean of the Poisson distribution is a function of a set of independent variables, which 
comprise both target management actions and firm specific characteristics. Of the target 
management actions considered, legal defense and the induction of a white knight into the 
contest are significant and appear to generate further bids. As regards firm specific charac­
teristics, a high initial bid premium apparently deters third parties from entering the bidding 
process, and hence is associated with fewer bids. Firm size is also a significant explanatory 
variable with larger firms receiving more bids. However, by including a size-squared variable 
we find that beyond a critical point (approximately $12 billion in assets) the number of 
bids received by the target firm tends to decline. This fmding is interesting since it suggests 
that in the initial stages, size has information value attracting further bids whereas at higher 
levels it represents a wealth constraint to bidders. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows: In Section 2, we outline the data collec­
tion procedure and sample characteristics. Section 3 consists of an overview of count data 
methodology. Our results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 contains concluding remarks. 
2. Data 
The sample comprises firms that were targets of tender offers during the period 1978-1985. 
Target firms were identified from the Schedule 140-1 filings which appear in the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) News Digest. A Schedule 140-1 form has to be filed 
by the bidder with the SEC prior to the commencement of a tender offer. Subsequently, 
the Wall Street Journal lndex (WSJI) was scanned to pick those firms which resisted the 
tender offer. In addition, the nature of target management resistance and the outcome of 
the tender offer were recorded. Our sample consists of 126 target firms which were taken 
over, within an observation period of 52 weeks. 
In this study, the dependent variable represents the number of bids (count) after the ini­
tial bid received by the target fmn. The following explanatory variables are considered; 
see Table 1 for details of sample characteristics. 
Table l. Descriptive measures of sample variables. 
The sample represents 126 firms that were 1argets of tender 
offers during the period 1978-1985. Target firms were identified 
from the Schedule 140-1 filings which appear in the Securities 
and Exclu:mge Commission News Digest. The iiaU Street Jour­
nal index was scanned to pick those firms which resisted the 
tender offer and to record the nature of larget management 
resistance. Relevant firm specific characteristics were obtained 
from various sources. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent Variable (count) 
Number of subsequent bids 1.738 1.432 
Explanatory Variables 
Legal Defense* 0.428 0.496 
Real Restructuring* 0.182 0.387 
Financial Restructuring* 0.103 0.305 
White Knight* 0.595 0.492 
lnltial Bid Premium** 1.346 0.189 
Institutional Holdings(%) 0.251 0.185 
Size*** 1.219 3.096 
Regulation* 0.269 0.445 
*These variables are binary taking value 1 when action is 
laken; 0 otherwise. 
**Represent~ percen1age excess over the stock price 14 days 
prior to the public announcement; 1.0 represents base level. 
-Represents book value of tolal assets in $ billions. 
2.1. Target Management Actions 
i. 	Legal Defense takes value 1 if target management responds with a lawsuit; 0 other­
wise. The choice of this variable is due to the Jarrell (1985) study. Jarrell concluded 
that target managements appear to take a value maximizing gamble by engaging in 
legal defensive activity. If the fLling of a lawsuit, or the threat to do so, creates a delay 
in the tender offer process, this may allow other bidders to enter. On the other hand, 
if the lawsuit is perceived to be more than a delaying tactic, the original bidder may 
decide to withdraw the offer and other potential bidders may be similarly deterred. 
However, given the nature of our sample and the results from the Jarrell study, we 
expect this variable to have a positive influence on the number of bids received. 
ii. 	Real Restructuring takes value 1 if target management proposes some change in the 
asset structure; 0 otherwise. 
iii. Financial Restructuring takes value 1 if target mangement proposes some change 
in the ownership structure; 0 otherwise. 
The two variables cited above were originally characterized by the Dann and 
DeAngelo (1988) study. This study strongly indicts target management for entrench­
ment behavior. If the Dann and DeAngelo findings carry over to our sample, we may 
observe these type of actions dampening the auction process. However, as previously 
pointed out, our sample consists of successful tender offers which implies, at least 
ex post, that management may have been trying to secure the best deal for stockholders. 
Of course, it is always possible that management may have been actually trying to 
protect their own interests and gave up the fight on realizing that it was a lost cause. 
We are therefore neutral as to the effects of proposed changes in asset/ownership struc­
ture on the auction process. 
iv. 	White Knight takes value 1 if target management invites a friendly third party to 
enter the bidding; 0 otherwise.3 Our definition of a white knight resembles that followed 
by Banerjee and Owers (1992). This type of management action differs substantially 
from the type of actions discussed above. By inviting a friendly bidder into the con­
test, management is signaling that it is prepared to cede at least some control. The 
entry (or potential entry) of at least one additional bidder is expected to stimulate 
the auction process. 
2.2. 	Firm Specific Characteristics 
v. 	Initial Bid Premium represents the percentage excess of the first hostile bid price 
over the market price of the firm's stock fourteen working days prior to the tender 
offer announcement. The idea is to select a time frame that allows for information 
leakage prior to the public announcement.4 We expect this variable to exercise a nega­
tive influence on additional bids. Our reasoning is that third party bidders are likely 
to be deterred by a high initial bid. This could be due either to a perception that the 
bidder is overpaying5 or the bid is preemptive in nature, which by definition should 
deter subsequent bids. 
vi. 	Institutional Holdings percentage serves as a proxy for stockholder independence. 
The percentage of institutional holdings to total outstanding stock was ascertained from 
the Standard & Poors' Stockholder Guide. If institutions play a monitoring role, tar­
get managements are less likely to engage in overt entrenchment behavior. Also, the 
presence of a seemingly uncommitted block of stockholders is clearly a plus from 
the perspective of potential bidders.6 Accordingly, we expect this variable to have a 
positive influence on the number of bids. 
vii. Size represents the total assets of the target firm, in book value terms, in $ (billions). 
This information was collected from Compustat/Annual reports. The effect of size 
on the auction process is not obvious. If capital rationing is a practical reality, then 
size may operate as a wealth constraint to potential bidders. On the other hand, size 
may also proxy as an information variable. Tender offers for large firms are likely to 
receive more media coverage and thereby attract the attention of opportunistic bidders. 
We therefore include a size-squared variable to capture the potential non-monotonic 
effect of size on the expected number of bids. 
viii. 	Regulation takes value 1 if either the Federal Trade Commission or the Justice Depart­
ment intervenes by way of requesting additional information or mounting a court chal­
lenge to the tender offer; 0 otherwise. We expect regulatory scrutiny to have a negative 
effect on the auction process. 
3. Methodology 
Information on many economic variables appears in the form of a count denoting the num­
ber of times a phenomenon has occurred. Regression models that fail to explicitly take 
this characteristic of the dependent variable into account are clearly inefficient. Count data 
regression models belong to a class of limited dependent variable models in which the depen­
dent variable, Y;, takes on only non-negative integer values. Recently, such models have 
been employed in econometric research with such applications as: number of visits to a 
doctor (Cameron and Trivedi (1986)), number of patents issued (Hausman et al. (1984)), 
number of daily homicides (Grogger (1990)), number of strikes (Cameron and Trivedi 
(1990)). In this article, we employ such a model in the context of the number of takeover 
bids received by a target frrm after the initial bid. 
Poisson regression models have been often used as a benchmark for analyzing count data. 
The Poisson probability distribution for Y; is 
i = 1, 2, ... , N, (3.1) 
where Y; = 0, 1, 2, . . . , denotes the realized value of the dependent variable Y;. Further­
more, the independent variables Xu U = 1, ... , k) are incorporated by considering a 
regression specification of the form 
A; = exp(X;/3), (3.2) 
where {3 is an unknown vector ofk parameters to be estimated. This specification ensures 
non-negative predictions given by y = exp(X)J)? The parameter vector~ is estimated by 
maximizing the following log-likelihood function derived from (3.1): 
N 
£ =2: [-exp(X;/3) + Y;(X;/3) - ln(y;!)]. (3.3) 
i=l 
The mean of Y;, conditional on X;. is given by E(Y;IX;) = A; = exp(X;/3). Therefore, as 
iJE(Y;IX;)IiJXu = {3jE(Y;IX;), the coefficients are interpreted as average proportionate 
changes in E(Y;IX;) for a unit change in X;.s 
A property of the Poisson regression model is the conditional mean-variance equality 
of Y; viz. E(Y;IX;) = Var(Y;/X;) = A;. This equality is often considered restrictive since 
real data frequently exhibit overdispersion. As failure of the above restriction can lead to 
distorted inferences, specification tests for a Poisson model are based on inspecting the 
conditional mean-variance discrepancies in the sample. A test ofoverdispersion is given by:9 
N 
T = 2: [(Y; - A;)2 - Y;]/(2EAr)"\ (3.4) 
i=l 
where, asymptotically, T has a standard normal distribution un4er the null hypothesis of 
no extra variations with A; replaced by its maximum likelihood estimate. The value of this 
statistic in our sample is - 1.02, implying no extra Poisson variations. Dean and Lawless 
(1989) propose an adjustment which makes the above test perform better in smnJJer samples. 
The sample value of this adjusted test statistic is - 0.30, which still supports the Poisson 
model. 
4. Results 
The central question that we seek to address in this study is whether target management 
resistance is associated with setting an auction process in motion. As outlined above, we 
employ a count data approach to capture the auction element in a takeover contest. A basic 
but relevant question is whether target stockholders are in fact better off under an auction 
scenario, i.e. , are additional bids necessarily wealth enhancing? 
To lay this foundation , we report the results of a standard event study analysis in Table 
2. We compute cumulative average abnormal returns (CARS) over three event windows: 
(-5, 60), (0, 60) and (+5, 60). This is done for the total sample as well as subsamples 
representing firms that received zero, one, two, three or more bids beyond the initial bid. 
Table 2. CARS % (Z-5tatistics' in parentheses). 
Cumulative average abnormal returns (CARS)2 over various event windows for the total sample 
and various subsamples based on number of additional bids received; day 0 corresponds to 
public announcement date of tender offer. 
Event Windows 
(-5, 60) (0, 60) (+5, 60) 
Total Sample 
(N = 125)l 
Zero Bids Beyond Initial Bids 
(N - 9) 
One Bid Beyond Initial Bid 
(N = 62) 

l'wo Bids Beyond Initial Bid 

(N = 31) 

Three or More Bids Beyond Initial Bid 

(N = 23) 
33.49 
(24.40)* 
17.83 
(3.53)* 
37.50 
(17.72)* 
24.52 
(10.64)* 
40.92 
(13.23)* 
20.59 8.25 
(15.55)* (6.63)* 
8.76 -3.65 
(2.03)*"' (-0.35) 
22.93 8.83 
(10.96)* (3 .86)" 
13.94 4.25 
(6.29)* (2.66)* 
27.90 16.76 
(9.68)* (6.24)* 
*represents significance at a = 0.01 

**represents significance at a = 0.05 

I . 	Z.Statist.ics computed as per standard procedure in the literature. Refer to Dodd and Warner 
(1983) for details. 
2. 	CARS estimated based on the standard market model approach. Market model parameters 
were estimated from days - 150 through -31 relative to the event date. 
3. 	One firm had to be dropped from the original sample due to insufficient data points in 
the estimation period. 
Table 3. Poisson model estimation results. 
A Poisson count data model is estimated where the dependent variable 
represents the number ofbids (count) after the initial bid received by 
the target firm. The explanatory variables considered are various target 
management actions and fum specific cbaracterstics. 
Variable Coefficient t.Statistics 
Constant 
Target Management Actions 
Legal Defense 
Real Restructuring 
F'lnaocial Restructuring 
White Knight 
Firm Specific Clu:zracreristics 
Initial Bid Premium 
Institutional Holdings 
Size 
Size Squared 
Regulation 
0.986 
0.260 
-0.195 
0.074 
0.481 
- 0.677 
- 0.361 
0.178 
- 0.007 
- 0.029 
1.846** 
1.723** 
-1.015 
0.341 
3.030* 
-1.798** 
-0.853 
2.970* 
-2.416* 
-0.183 
*representS significance at 01 = 0.01 

**represents significance at 01 = 0.10 

Ttsrs ofPoisson SpecificaJion (Mean-ij,riance Equality) 
Standard Test Statistic = -1.02 (p = 0.3078) 

Dean-Lawless Adjusted Test Statistic = -o.30 (p = 0.7642) 

The pattern that emerges confirms the intuition that target stockholders are indeed better 
off receiving more rather than fewer bids. The CARS are highest for the "three or more 
bids" subsample and lowest for the "zero bids" subsample across all event windows. More­
over, the mean CARS for subsamples with higher bids is significantly greater than the mean 
CARS for subsamples with lower bids within each event window.10 This is verified by a 
series of "differences in means" t-tests at the referee's suggestion. 
The estimation results of the Poisson model are presented in Table 3. We find that of 
the target management action variables, legal defense and white knight are significant with 
positive coefficients (implying more counts) as hypothesized. Legal defense probably works 
by inducing delay in the process that allows potential bidders to enter. This result broadly 
comports with the Jarrell (1985) study, which was carried out in the more traditional wealth 
measurement (excess returns) framework. The white knight variable is strongly significant 
(p-value = 0.003) . Clearly the entry of a friendly bidder fucilitates the auction process 
and benefits target stockholders. This finding also complements the recent results reported 
by Banerjee and Owers (1992), who show that white knight bidders on average experience 
negative returns. While a takeover contest is generally not a zero-sum game, we infer that 
a white knight strategy by target management is successful in bidding up the offer price. 
The financial and real restructuring variables appear to be neutral in terms of their effect 
on the number of bids received by target firms. 
So far as firm specific characteristics are concerned only the initial bid premium and 
size variables are significant. The level of institutional ownership and regulatory interven­
tion apparently do not influence the bidding process. The bid premium coefficient is negative, 
which implies that a high initial bid premium deters subsequent bids. This result suggests 
that there may be value to preemptive bidding.11 
An interesting result pertains to the relationship between target firm size and the number 
of bids received. We reiterate our reasoning regarding the size variable as follows: ceteris 
paribus, an increase in target firm size is associated with fewer bids; the idea being that 
potential bidders would bump into a wealth constraint. Alternatively, since media coverage 
of the takeover contest is generally proportionate to target firm size, a larger firm may 
attract more bids by virtue of being in the public eye. In a sense, subsequent bidders enjoy 
an informational free ride. As both these effects may be present, we attempt to capture 
the postulated non-monotonic relationship between size and expected bids by including 
a size-squared variable along with a size variable.l2 
From Table 3, we find that both the size and size-squared variables are strongly signifi­
cant with positive and negative coefficients respectively. This suggests that for smaller firms, 
the information effect dominates the wealth constraint effect leading to further bids. However, 
size represents a wealth constraint that operates as a deterrent to additional bids for very 
large target firms. The information effect for these firms may be muted since they are ex­
tensively covered by the financial press even prior to the takeover bid. 
We investigate the size effect further by simulating the number of additional bids associated 
with different firm sizes holding other regressors constant at their mean values (refer to 
Figure 1). We observe that for most firms the information effect appears to be predominant. 
It is possible that the size variable captures more than just information release, via media 
coverage, about a target firm going into play. For instance, Roll (1988) summarizes the 
argument regarding the connection between executive rewards and firm size. The managers 
of the bidder firms may have an incentive for growth, including growth by takeover, even 
when there is no anticipated gain for their shareholders. This can be an added rationale 
for larger target firms attracting more bids. 
The wealth constraint effect is significant only for firms with total assets exceeding $12 
billion, which represent a small proportion of our sample. At first glance, the finding that 
the wealth constraint kicks in at such a high level is surprising. However, it should be noted 
that the late seventies and eighties (the period represented by our sample) were characterized 
by relatively easy access to debt capital for corporate restructuring activity. 
5. Conclusion 
In this article we implement a relatively new methodology in the area of corporate finance. 
We use a count data model to explain the variations in the numbers of bids received by 
firms whose managements resist takeover. We first confirm using a standard event study 
approach that there is a positive association between the number of bids received and target 
stockholder wealth. We find that of the target management actions considered, legal defensive 
activity and the induction of a white knight are significantly associated with additional bids. 
Our findings spring from an examination of successful tender offers and may provide policy 
directions to future target managements, whose intent is to maximize stockholder interest. 
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Figure I. Simulated effect of firm size on mean number of bids. 
In a more positive line of inquiry, we also examine various firm specific characteristics 
and their effect on the auction process. A high initial bid premium seems to preempt fur­
ther bids. Further, firm size has a non-monotonic effect on additional bids. Except for very 
large target firms (assets exceeding $12 billion), size is positively associated with addi­
tional bids. 
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Notes 
l. See, for example, DeAngelo and Rice (1983). 
2. We confirm using a standard event study approach that additional bids are in fact wealth enhancing to target 
stockholders. Details are provided in the results section. 
3. The inclusion ofthis variable is due to the referee's suggestion that we consider the influence of friendly bids. 
4. The precedent for fourteen days was set in Walkling (1985), who employs a logit model to predict takeover 
success. 
5. For instance, refer to Varaiya and Ferris (1987) for an analysis of the winner's curse. 
6. Refer to Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988) on the role of institutional investors in the context of voting on 
anti-takeover amendments proposed by management. 
7. Note that the standard linear regression models do not guarantee non-negative predictions. 
8. Tn linear regression models, the coefficients (3j = iJE(Y;IX;)tax0 simply measure changes in E(lj/X;) for a 
unit change in X;. 
9. Refer to Cameron and Trivedi (1990) and Dean and Lawless (1989) for details. 
10. 	The one ldnk in the pattern is that the CARS for the "two bid" subsamp!e are lower than those for the "one 
bid" subsample. Other than this one irregularity, our results support the association between number ofbids 
and stockholder wealth maximization. 
11 . Refer to Fishman (1988) for a theoretical treatment of preemptive bidding in takeover contests. 
12. 	Even though our specification, (3.2), implies non-linear influences of regressors on expected counts, the 
non-monotonic effect ofa given regressor is captured by including its squared value as an additional variable. 
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